ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Executive compensation has become a very pressing issue in the mid of the economic crisis, failing corporate governance systems and growing income inequalities in rich, industrialized countries. "One of the great, as-yet-unsolved problems today is executive compensation and how it is/has come to be determined" (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004, p.189) . Executive compensation is widely perceived as abusive and grossly excessive and an important factor in expanding the unfair distribution of wealth. Among the 200 most highly-paid chief executives at the largest U.S. public companies, Oracle's Lawrence J. Ellison is the best paid CEO and earned $96.2 million as total annual compensation in 2012 (Russell 2013) . He has received $1.8 billion over the past 20 years (Anderson, Klinger and Pizzigati, 2013) . The lowest paid on the same list is General Motors' D. F. Akerson who earned $11.1 million. A CEO made 354 times more than an average worker in 2012 (Anderson, Klinger and Pizzigati, 2013) .
The best paid CEO in Canada for 2012 was Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd.'s CEO, Hunter Harrison, who received $49.2-million as total annual compensation, significantly higher than the 2011 best paid CEO, Magna's F. Stronach who received $40.9 million. In 2011, the average annual salary was $45,488 and Canada's top 50 CEOs earned 235 times more than the average Canadian worker (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2013) . These executive pay practices contrast with the growing inequality.
Canada ranks 25th among the 30 countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development with regard to child poverty. The average child poverty rate for all children in Canada is 17% while 40% of Indigenous children live in poverty (Macdonald and Wilson, 2013) .
A remarkable move forward is needed in order to narrow the gap that executive compensation creates within companies and society at large. The failures of existing corporate governance systems can be blamed for the excessiveness of executive pay.
"Ultimately, the problems of executive compensation arise from a basic corporate governance problem" (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004, p.189) . The inability of modern corporate governance mechanisms to control excessive executive compensation and monitor self-4 interested and self-indulgent executives has become evident around the world. The problems of executive compensation can be fully addressed by adopting reforms that would confront corporate governance ideals with a different set of incentives, structures and objectives (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004) . Some lessons can be learned from comparative studies of corporate governance systems.
Japan has developed a pattern of low executive pay. For example, the highest paid CEO is Nissan Motor Co.'s Carlos Ghosn who earned 988 million yen (US$10.1 million) in the year ended March 2013 (Mukai and Masatsugu, 2013) , little changed from the previous year and modestly improved from his US$ 9.5 million compensation for 2009.
That does not even put him among the top 200 most highly-paid U.S. company chiefs and the top 20 best paid CEOs in Canada for 2012. Japanese executive compensation practices have thus diverged from the West and it is important to explore the reasons for such low CEO pay pattern. This paper discusses executive compensation in Japan from a comparative perspective and highlights some of facts and reasons that may account for the development of the Japanese pattern of low executive pay while maintaining high levels of efficiency and competitiveness. It argues that the activism of long-term oriented institutional investors such as banks and the informal tying of executive pay to worker welfare in the context of a culture of intolerance to excessive executive compensation to a great extent explain the development of a pattern of low executive pay in Japan. The Japanese experience also demonstrates that lower executive compensation does not result in compromising firm performance and is a necessity to build a stakeholder-friendly 5 corporation. The paper begins with a quick overview of the corporate governance context of executive pay in Japan and the West. It then briefly reviews executive compensation practices in Japan, Canada and the United States and suggests that managers can be highly competitive with lower compensations as demonstrated in Japan. The last section is central and examines the corporate governance reasons that may account for the Japanese pattern of low executive compensation.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN JAPAN AND THE WEST IN A NUTSHELL
Organizing and governing a corporation in capitalist societies have always been a challenging task for business leaders, policy-makers and academics. Some practices appear to be common around the world and encompass "no limits on how long the company can be in business, investments occurring outside the company became the norm, and most importantly directors/management gained increased power over operations, as well as strong support from the courts" (Korten & Nace, Ch.1 p.2) . In addition, a corporation's legal personality, transferability of shares, delegated management under a board structure, shared ownership by investors of capital, and limited liability of owners and management are considered the common characteristics that structure the modern corporation (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001 ). This description of the corporation seems to be the consensus across countries.
Yet, the divergence in corporate governance becomes quite evident once the attention is drawn to countries with cultural differences that utilize distinctly different business practices such as Japan. As known, Western nations such as Canada and the United States constitute liberal market economies whereas Japan recognizes a more coordinated market approach. Within a liberal market economy, all coordination problems between firms, financiers, employees and other participants are largely handled through market incentives or free market mechanisms (Hall & Soskice, 2001 ). On the other hand, coordinated market economies rather depend heavily on non-market relationships within formal institutions and long term objectives (Hall & Soskice, 2001 ).
Specifically, Japanese firms tend to embody more of a total package organization and are committed to their long-term sustainability.
Companies in the West often embody a short term, top down mindset which can go a long way in flawing future company endeavours. Indeed, "the current system creates a culture of how much money they can make right now and not one that looks at how decisions affect the company ten years down the road. Few investors with power and CEO's in general never embrace a long-term outlook" (Gillespie & Zweig, 2010, p. 131) .
Positions, bonuses and general operations are based on this short term performance and top down framework. "In the United States and Canada, corporate governance is concerned with ensuring the firm run in the interests of shareholders and that its objective is to create wealth for them" (Franklin & Mengxin, 2007, p. 2) . This fundamental idea is also entrenched within the legal framework of both countries, notably through strong 7 fiduciary duties designed largely to maximize shareholder value (Franklin & Mengxin, 2007) .
Generally, three elements characterize the Japanese corporate governance model: main bank capital markets, keiretsu cross-holdings, and insider boards of directors (Higgins, 2004, p.96; Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome & Weintrop, 2007, pp. 58-60) . "The role of bank lending is crucial and the Japanese financial system is classified as bank-centered due to the predominance of corporate borrowings from a centrally designated bank, called the main bank. This main bank acts as the leader in monitoring Japanese firms and is also the top lender" (Higgins, 2004, p.98) .One of the advantages gained from the main bank is that it may operate as a mediator towards any outside market influences or tendencies.
The keiretsu is an industrial group whose member firms are bound by long term crossshareholdings and maintain strong business and financial ties (Higgins, 2004, p.99; Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome & Weintrop, 2007, p. 59) . The keiretsu system effectively eliminates the misrepresentation of management found in Western corporations by having strong monitoring mechanisms. By pooling voting rights, the keiretsu has control over member managers and ensures that none behave opportunistically or collude operations (Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome & Weintrop, 2007, p.59) . Firms that belong to the keiretsu are essentially bound together by a series of connected contracts which maintain the crucial business relationships that are required. Japanese boards are divided into a hierarchical structure based on promotion from within the company with very little influence from "outsiders" except for representatives of the main bank (Higgins, 2004) .
It is important to note that, after the deregulation of the financial systems and corporate governance reforms in Japan, banks were limited in their use of "mochiai" or cross-shareholding (Hoshi & Kashyap, 2010; Sakawa, Moriyama & Watanabel, 2012, p. 594 ) and the Commercial Code in 2003 allowed Japanese firms to adopt a new board system with three committees (auditing, nomination and compensation) similar to the Western systems (Sakawa, Moriyama & Watanabel, 2012, p. 594-595) . However, recent studies indicate that internationally exposed, more experienced and highly cross-held firms, with higher foreign ownership, are more likely to adopt the committee system (Chizema & Shinozawa, 2012) . On the other hand, firms with larger proportions of bank ownership are to some extent negatively associated with the adoption of the committee system (Chizema & Shinozawa, 2012) . As a result, the traditional monitoring of firms by banks appears to be declining (Chizema & Shinozawa, 2012) . This process of corporate governance reforms suggests that, in terms of executive compensation decisions, Japanese corporations may be making a slow transition from the old way of approving self-proposed executive compensation at the annual meeting of shareholders (Sakawa & Naoki, 2013 p.1120 have been documented (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004) . A higher proportion of bonuses and stock options are particularly evident in United States. Gathering information from base salaries, annual bonuses, long term incentive plans and stock options from both a Canadian and United States perspective reveals just how deep the gap is: According to a list of the 200 most highly-paid chief executives at the largest U.S.
public companies in 2013, Oracle's Lawrence J. Ellison remained the best paid CEO and earned $96.2 million as total annual compensation last year (Russell 2013) . He has received $1.8 billion over the past 20 years (Anderson, Klinger and Pizzigati, 2013) . The lowest paid on the same list is General Motors' D. F. Akerson who earned $11.1 million.
The top ten highest-paid CEOs on that list are as follows: (Alarie, 2003) . Additionally, a number of public web based disclosure sites have been initiated in Canada (sedar.com) and the United States (edgar.com) which contain all mandatory annual reports which present company, director and management based financial information. Without question the bulk of the disparity regarding CEO compensation rests within the United States. Canadian executive pay is also quite unwarranted and creates a rather ominous situation. The economy overall is not constructed to work at its ideal level when enormous compensation packages are handed out to a fraction of individuals within the population. Change is certainly needed, and it "would be wise to consider the competitive international environment in which we compete for corporate patronage" (Alarie, 2003, p.71) .
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"Perhaps one could accept the high pay levels of the United States and Canadian executives if one could observe the same high pay levels in other major industrialized countries" (Crystal,1991, p.204 ).
However, Japan has developed a pattern of low executive pay and has then made the excessiveness of executive pay and the wage disparities of the West more evident.
The following data shows that Japan has maintained lower compensation levels over the last 20 years: Recent data further confirms such a pattern of low executive pay in Japan. Nissan The disparities between executive pay and worker wages further show the extent to which Japan has diverged from the Western patterns of excessive executive compensation. "CEO pay was 7.8 times higher in Japan than the average worker, and 25.8 times in the United States in 1991, and this figure rose 11 times higher in Japan and an astounding 35 times larger in the United States" (Jackson, 2001, p.292) . The CEOworker pay disparity continued to worsen in the United States in the following years, reaching alarming proportions particularly when compared to the Japanese ratio: (Gongloff, 2013) . Needless to say, these large pay disparities harm employee morale and productivity. The 2010 Dodd-Frank legislation requiring CEO-worker pay ratio disclosure was enacted to correct such huge disparity and executive excessiveness, but it has not yet been implemented after three years (Anderson, Klinger and Pizzigati, 2013 p21) and has faced strong opposition from American corporations (Anderson, 2013) . In Canada, the average annual salary was $45,488 in 2011 and Canada's top 50 CEOs earned 235 times more than the average worker (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2013).
Interestingly, Japanese corporations have become some of the most competitive and efficient companies in the world while developing a pattern of low executive pay, low CEO-worker pay ratio and heavy income taxes. This presents important challenges to
Western beliefs of the need to correlate high executive pay, shareholder value and firm competitiveness. "The Japanese regularly lecture the West on their short-sighted behavior.
They ask how they will ever become competitive unless you are willing to make longterm investments -investments that may produce only losses for years before they begin to pay off" (Crystal, 1991, p.205-206) . In particular, Canada and the United States may want to learn that even with lower salaries, higher tax levels, and greater monitoring/disclosure mandates, corporate lifestyle and business operations do not have to suffer. A critical factor in maintaining firm competitiveness with a pattern of low executive pay has been the uniqueness of the Japanese corporate governance system that provides effective monitoring and disclosure and aids in reducing high risk investments/business ventures. The following section further discusses the importance of 18 this Japanese corporate governance system for controlling executive compensation.
EXPLAINING THE PATTERN OF LOW EXECUTIVE PAY IN JAPAN
The above review of the patterns of executive pay in Japan, Canada and the US once again confirms that excessive executive compensation is not a universal norm and has little to do with efficiency. Furthermore, the Japanese experience sheds light on the factors that may account for the development of low executive pay patterns. While the Japanese corporate governance system can be credited for the development of lower executive compensation practices, the Japanese business culture steers the governance of corporations towards a practice that is unfriendly to excessive executive pay. A business culture that does not tolerate excessiveness neither encourage greed is likely to both favor lower executive compensation practices and harness the corporate governance system to control executive excessiveness.
The Japanese practice of paying lower compensations to executives appears to be consistent with a long-standing tradition of discouraging greed and shareholder value maximization as the dominant principles of running a company. Contemporary Japanese firms continue to share long-standing attitudes against greed and shareholder primacy in order to maintain social harmony and are often concerned about the long-term sustainability of the firm (Nakamura & Rebien, 2012 p.729) . Executives have customarily avoided standing out as highly compensated individuals and a significant portion of their compensation package has traditionally been in the form of perquisites as opposed to salary, which has to some extent changed with the recent introduction of stock options in Japan (Kato, Lemmon, Luo and Schallheim, 2005 p. 438-439) . Even after stock options were legally allowed in 1997, the number of firms that adopted stock options increased until the mid 2000s and since then has remained the same or decreased slightly (Morikawa, 2012 (Mukai and Masatsugu, 2013) .
Toyota has retaken the title of world's biggest automaker from General Motors last year (Mukai and Masatsugu, 2013) . Moreover, it is not uncommon that Japanese CEO's will return a portion of their compensations when their companies perform poorly. For instance, in 2010, Toyoda rejected his bonus pay after a recall of more than 8 million cars worldwide, making his annual compensation the lowest among Japan's three largest automakers for that year (Mukai and Masatsugu, 2013 (Fairchild, 2013 (Fairchild, 2013) . This weak link between pay and performance has been recently proven with the finding that, in the past 20 years, nearly 40 per cent of the highest-paid CEOs in the U.S. have been bailed out, fired or arrested for illegal activities (Anderson, Klinger and Pizzigati, 2013) .
Such Japanese business culture has encouraged a clear responsibility of the corporation to its stakeholders (Nakamura & Rebien, 2012 p.729) . The prevalence of such strong stakeholder culture in Japan has also worked against the development of excessive executive compensation practices. The belief that, a company should not be run solely to protect the interest of shareholders or executives and the interests of multiple participants that have a stake and contribute to the sustainability of the company are also important, has often influenced executive pay decisions. "Japan actively ensures that firms are run in such a way that society's resources are used efficiently by taking into account a range of stakeholders, in addition to shareholders, while not having a fiduciary responsibility" (Franklin & Mengxin, 2007, p.3 (Franklin and Mengxin, 2007) Embedded in a culture that is often unfriendly to greed and friendly to stakeholders' interest, institutional investors, with a long-term stake and therefore interested in the long-tem sustainability of corporations, have been a driving force in maintaining lower compensation levels in Japan. Specifically, Japanese banks have played a critical role in controlling excessive compensation, particularly in keiretsu firms.
The main bank is usually the top lender to, and one of the largest shareholders of, the firm (Aoki, 1990; Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome & Weintrop, 2007, p.58 ). In such a position, banks have been able to monitor management via shareholder ownership and bankappointed directors (Sakawa, Moriyama & Watanabel, 2012, p. 596) . Banks have been effective in limiting the ability of CEO's to control corporations and their monitoring role 22 has helped keep executive compensation at lower levels (Sakawa & Watanabel, 2008, p 451; Basu et al 2007) . In particular, "CEOs of keiretsu firms are more subject to major shareholder monitoring and less able to use their power to increase their own compensation" (Li Sun, Zhao and Yang, 2010, p.784; similarly Kato 1997) . Some studies have found that executive compensation is lower in keiretsu firms than in non-keiretsu firms (Berglof & Perotti, 1994; Kato 1997; Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome & Weintrop, 2007; Sakawa & Naoki, 2013 p.1121 . Such shareholder monitoring is associated with the leading role of the main bank that has great control over the keiretsu member firms (Li Sun, Zhao and Yang, 2010, p.784; Kato 1997 ) and helps reduce managerial opportunism (Sakawa, Moriyama & Watanabel, 2012, p. 596; Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome & Weintrop, 2007, p.63) .
However, after the deregulation of the financial system and corporate governance reforms in Japan and in the face of the pressures from global capital markets, Japanese banks appear to be gradually withdrawing from their traditional monitoring of firms (Chizema & Shinozawa, 2012) . The adoption of committee systems and the increase of foreign ownership over the last decade are likely to affect the traditional bank-centered corporate governance systems with their higher bank ownership and bank-appointed directors (Sakawa, Moriyama & Watanabel, 2012, p.605) . These changes might diminish the power of banks to control potentially excessive executive compensation in the future.
For instance, according to the 2003 reforms of the Commercial Code, firms were allowed to adopt the committee systems, including a compensation committee which is expected to design individual executive compensation and be composed mostly of outside directors (Sakawa, Moriyama & Watanabel, 2012, p.606) . Similarly, the increasing presence of foreign shareholders puts pressure on existing executive compensation practices and may eventually result in spreading practices such as the wide use of stock options that may bring executive compensation closer to the excessiveness of Anglo-American standards.
It remains to be seen whether the Japanese pattern of low executive pay will resist and survive the new pressures.
In such a context in which banks, as lenders and major shareholders, have been active in controlling executive compensation, it should not be surprising to find competent boards that are also active in monitoring executives and are intolerant to excessive executive pay. "Japanese boards are better able to think strategically, and they are composed of people who ask tough questions and bring a wide range of relevant experiences to the boardroom" (Gillespie and Zweig, 2010 p.270) . Taft and Gangaram (2003) maintain that "Japanese boards of directors pride themselves on the long-term solvency of the corporation and the solidification of consistent competition levels" and "stress the intrinsic rewards a CEO receives from steering the ship in the appropriate direction" (p.73, 75 ). Yet, " [u] nlike their American counterparts, Japanese boards of directors have not succumbed to the notion that CEO's need an excessive compensation package to be effective" (Taft & Singh, 2003, p.75) . Wealth concentration in the form of both increasing short-term shareholder returns and huge bonus for directors does not seem to be an imperative in the eyes of Japanese boards. In particular, Japanese boards that are smaller and have outside directors tend to pay lower compensations to their executives (Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome & Weintrop, 2007, p.75) . Bank-appointed directors are active monitors of executives and executive compensation is both smaller and less sensitive to performance in firms with a main bank relationship or bank-appointed directors (Abe, Gaston & Kubo 2005, p. 389; Sakawa & Watanabel, 2008) .
Consistent with a strong stakeholder culture, the interests of workers are given significant consideration and thus inform the decisions about the compensation of corporate executives. Indeed, "Japan has made a conscious decision to try to protect its workers from unemployment, even at the expense of financial gain" (Stabile, 2001, p. 3).
Japanese corporations are known for their commitment to lifetime employment (Abe, Gaston & Kubo 2005, p 389) , although this has not been applied equally to male and female workers and the gender wage gap remains high (Nakamura & Rebien, 2012 p.743). Nevertheless, the strong protection of workers' interest is part of the larger commitment to promote industrial citizenship of labor in addition to the financial commitment of capital (Jackson 2001 at p.121 ).
It should not come as a surprise then that employees' wages are often taken into account when setting executive pay. Some studies have indicated that changes in Japanese executive base pay are linked to general movements in employee wages and 25 salaries (Kubo, 2005; Colpan & Yoshikawa, 2012 (Mukai and Masatsugu, 2013) .
It would also be expected that executive bonuses will be lowered when employee bonuses are reduced in order save labour cost and avoid massive lay-offs in tough economic times (Abe, Gaston & Kubo 2005, p 379) . The possibility of a promotion tournament that uses executive compensation also as a reward for a successful career after a series of employee competitions within Japanese corporations further reinforces the need to link executive pay to the wages of workers at lower levels (Abe, Gaston & Kubo 2005, p 388-389) . In sum, this Japanese practice of tying executive pay to the salary of workers helps keep executive compensation lower while considerably narrowing the pay gap between CEOs and average Japanese workers down to some of smallest in the world and distributing corporate gains more equally.
In contrast, CEO's in the West have gained significant power in corporate decisions and earn excessive compensations often regardless of workers' wages, losses, and un-competitiveness. "The CEO has no boss. We pretend that the CEO has a boss. We pretend that it is the board of directors. But it almost never is. Basically, the board of directors of most organizations, just like all other subordinates, see themselves as employees of the CEO" (Gillespie & Zweig, 2010, p.97) . Most CEO's dictate and work to implement their own boards, agendas, compensation packages and information flows.
"Thus, many boards even though their primary commitment is to shareholders, come to represent executive interests instead" (Gillespie & Zweig, 2010, p. 97) . Corporate board oversight has become largely an illusion. "There is a continued dysfunction of too many boards: selecting inadequate CEOs in the first place; failing to advise and mentor executives and avoiding realistic successful planning" (Gillespie & Zweig, 2010, p.104) .
As a result, excessive executive compensation and short-term profit maximization dominate corporate decisions to the detriment of the long-term sustainability of companies and the well-being of employees. Countrywide Financials and the compensation paid to its CEO Angelo Mozilo is one of the most obvious examples of that problem:
Mr. Mozilo ran roughshod over his board, while receiving more than $200 million in salary and bonuses in 2007, while Countrywide, the very same year announced a $1.2 billion dollar loss in the third quarter and a $422 million loss in the fourth quarter. As the company's stock dropped 80% during this time, Mr. Mozilo was paid $2 million and received an additional $20 million in stock options while selling off $122 million more (Gillespie & Zweig, 2010, p. 126/127) .
CONCLUSION
This paper has discussed the pattern of low executive compensation in Japan. It was argued that the activism of long-term oriented institutional investors such as banks and the informal tying of executive pay to worker welfare in the context of a culture of intolerance to excessive executive compensation have been critical in the development of a pattern of low executive pay in Japan. The Japanese experience also reveals that lower executive compensation does not result in compromising firm performance and is a necessary condition to build a stakeholder-friendly corporation. These findings suggest some lessons for regulating excessive executive compensation in modern corporations around the world. Japan's executive compensation practices indicate that the presence of more effective internal controls may help in controlling excessiveness in executive pay.
In particular, the active role of institutional shareholders with a long-term orientation and the adoption of a tougher board oversight in the context of a culture that is unfriendly to 28 greed and friendly to stakeholders would be ideal, but this requires fundamental changes to existing corporate beliefs in the West. Furthermore, the tying of employees' interest to executive pay is effective in lowering executive compensation and some form of employee participation in the governance of corporations should also be given serious consideration as it may help monitor the implementation of such tying while fostering a stakeholder culture.
Further research is needed in several respects. This work is based on a review of the literature on the determinants of executive compensation in Japan and more empirical investigations would be ideal to expand some of the findings associated with the pattern of low executive compensation. It is also important to explore in a more in-depth manner both the influence of the Japanese business culture on the development of executive compensation practices and the extent to which the pressures from the globalization of the capital market can transform such practices in the near future.
